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Abstract
The Mortensen-Pissarides model with unemployment benefits and taxes has been able to
account for the variation in unemployment rates across countries but does not explain why
geographical mobility is very low in some countries (on average, three times lower in Europe
than in the U.S.). We build a model in which both unemployment and mobility rates are
endogenous. Our findings indicate that an increase in unemployment benefits and in taxes
does not generate a strong decline in mobility and accounts for only half to two-thirds of the
difference in unemployment from the US to Europe. We find that with higher commuting
costs the effect of housing frictions plays a large role and can generate a substantial decline
in mobility. We show that such frictions can account for the differences in unemployment and
mobility between the US and Europe.
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1 Introduction
The Mortensen-Pissarides model has been shown to successfully explain cross-country differences
in unemployment and unemployment spells with two labor market institutions: unemployment
benefits and taxes. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) highlights the fact that roughly half of the
mileage between a US unemployment rate (6%) to a European one (11%) can be explained by
each institution. However, there are other differences in labor markets between countries left
unaccounted for, such as geographical mobility. The residential mobility rate (both inter and intra-
state) is three times higher in the US than the corresponding rates in Europe, and this seems to be
a major source of non-resilience of unemployment in Continental Europe.
To study this specific difference, we build a modified version of Mortensen-Pissarides in order
to capture geographical mobility. Workers receive offers characterized by a commute distance, and
have the possibility to move conditional on receiving housing offers. Within a very parsimonious
setup, our model captures job acceptance decisions, decisions to move to another dwelling and job
creation decisions, with both search and matching frictions in the housing and labor market. The
model also captures the complementarity between commuting and moving decisions.
In our model, a job location has an associated commuting time that may affect the job accep-
tance decision. Obstacles to mobility, such as regulations in the housing market, will affect the
reservation strategy of workers. Thus, aggregate unemployment will have an effect on the func-
tioning of the housing market. The model can be thought of as the “dual” of typical search models
of the labor market. In particular, in the standard search setup there may be a non-degenerate
distribution of wages but distance is degenerate. In our model, the distribution of wages is degen-
erate but there exists instead a non-degenerate distribution of distance from one’s job. Gaumont,
Schindler, and Wright (2006) provide an example of how a non-degenerate wage distribution can
arise from ex-ante homogeneous agents. In their model, when a worker chooses a job they also
randomly choose a “cost to taking the job” that can be interpreted in the context of our model as a
commuting cost.
We show that there is a complementarity between institutional ingredients that make commute
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more expensive (gasoline tax, price of cars and car insurance) and frictions in the housing mar-
ket. Since both components are higher in Europe than in the US, we have a potentially attractive
explanation of European unemployment; however, we also know from earlier work, notably from
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) that there is also a complementarity between various “pure” labor
market institutions, such as unemployment benefits and payroll taxes.
Therefore, we provide a quantitative exercise to capture the effect of changes in those four
factors (benefits, labor taxes, commute costs and housing frictions) on unemployment, unemploy-
ment duration and household’s mobility. Our findings indicate that an increase in unemployment
benefits and in taxes do not generate a strong decline in mobility and account for only two-thirds
of the required increase in unemployment from the US to Europe. We find that with higher com-
muting costs, like those in Europe, the effect of housing frictions play a large role and can generate
a decline in mobility similar to that in Europe, roughly one-third of that in the U.S.
In a related model, Head and Lloyd-Ellis (2008) use a spatial model of housing and show that
home owners are less mobile than renters, but that the effect of home ownership on unemployment
is quantitatively small. In our paper there is no distinction between owning a home or renting and
therefore we abstract from such differences. We view our paper as complentary to theirs as they
focus mainly on frictions between housing markets.
Section 2 provides a comparison of mobility and commuting costs for the US and EU. Sec-
tion 3 presents the model with labor market and housing frictions.Section 4 describes the optimal
strategies and equilibrium. Section 5 describes how frictions in the housing market affect mobility
and unemployment rates. Section 6 lays out the calibration strategy and parameters. Section 7
concludes.
2 Empirical motivation
This paper starts with four facts. First, Table 1 reveals that 15.5% of American residents move
yearly for one reason or another. In comparison, data for fifteen European Union countries show
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that less than 5% of residents move yearly.1
Table 1: Mobility in the U.S. and E.U.
US EU15
Mobility rate 15.5% 4.95%
Share within county / area 0.58 0.83
Share between county / area 0.42 0.17
Second, Table 2 provides an overview of reasons for moving for those that moved. In the U.S.,
most of the intra-county mobility is house related (65.4%), and only a small fraction (5.6%) move
within a county for job related reasons. In contrast, work related mobility is approximately 33% of
inter-county moves. Family related mobility is a fairly constant fraction of all moves. In the E.U.,
perhaps surprisingly, there is a very similar pattern. Although residents in the U.S. move about
three times the rate of those in the E.U., the reasons why they move are roughly similar. This is
our second fact. This observation suggests that the shocks that affect mobility are similar across
the countries; yet, there is substantially less overall mobility in the E.U. 2
Third, there are large geographical mobility differences between countries. Scandinavian coun-
tries report mobility rates which are close to the US rates, while Southern European countries
exhibit the lowest of all rates. Part of the differences may be due to socio-cultural factors, such
as family attachment, or to differences in regions leading to higher mobility costs. But objective
factors can be identified too: for example rental housing market regulations as shown by Djankov,
1Data for the U.S. comes from Geographic Mobility, Current Population Reports, P20-538, U.S. Census, May,
2001. Data for the E.U. comes from the European Community Household Panel 1999-2001. Mobility data for the
U.S. come from the U.S. Census 2000. The two data sources cover essentially the same time period and ask very
similar questions, making for a useful comparison of mobility patterns across countries. Although the paper does
not address short vs. long distance moves (this is addressed in a companion paper Rupert, Stancanelli, and Wasmer
(2009)), we include those data for completeness. About 58% of the moves are within county. The share of moves
within an area/locality is higher, although at this level of disaggregation it is difficult to strictly compare to U.S.
counties.
2Why People Move: Exploring the March 2000 Current Population Survey, Current Population Reports, P23-204,
May, 2001, U.S. Department of the Census. The Census questions are actually more precise about the exact reasons
for mobility, while no detailed questions are available in the ECHP. Table 9 in Appendix gives the details for the U.S.
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Table 2: Reasons for Moving, US and EU15
Proportions, US Proportions, EU15
All pop. (1+) intra-county inter-county all intra-area inter-area all
Work related 5.6% 31.1% 16.2% Job related 7.61% 40.0% 14.3%
Family related 25.9% 26.9% 26.3% Personal Reason 31.6% 29.8% 31.3%
House related 65.4% 31.9% 51.6% House Related 59.1% 28.1% 52.7%
Others 3.0% 10.1% 6.0% Not Available 1.7% 2.11% 1.8%
All reasons 100% 100% All reasons 100% 100% 100%
La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2003). This is a composite index based on the difficulty
to evict a tenant, reflecting the complexity and the length of the procedure at various stages (pre-
trial, process of trial, execution of the court decision). In Table 8, in the appendix, we report the
numbers for 13 European countries and contrast the indices with mobility rates and with average
unemployment rates. Figure 1 plots the data in Table 8 and displays a strong, negative correlation
between housing market regulations and mobility rates across European countries. This is our third
fact.
Fourth, there are large differences between countries in the consumer price of gas. Table 3
shows that the price of gas in many European countries is two or three times that in the United
States. This in turn implies that commute costs are going to vary quite significantly. A good
example of this cost differences is accounted for by tax deductions allowed by the Internal Revenue
Service in the US and by the Tax administration in France; for the IRS, the standard mileage rate
in 2007 for the use of a car is 0.485$ per mile, that is 0.20 euro per kilometer. For the Tax authority
in France, for less than 5000 km, this is 0.514 euro per kilometer for a median size car.3
We then use these four facts to develop a model that allows for interaction between the labor
market and the housing market, both being markets with frictions, to address three questions: Can
the cross-country differences in mobility be accounted for by a frictional parameter in the housing
3Bulletin Officiel des Impoˆts, January 2007. The rate is actually progressive with power, from 0.37 euro / km for
smaller cars to 0.67 euro per km for more expensive cars.
5
Figure 1: Housing Regulations and Mobility
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market as fact 3 suggests? Is the level of unemployment in a country affected by imperfections in
the housing market; and if yes, through which mechanisms? We ask this question because of the
large difference in observed unemployment rates. In July of 2007 the unemployment rate in the
United States was 4.6 % while in the four large continental countries the unemployment rates were
substantially higher: The Spanish unemployment rate was over 8%, Italy around 7%, Germany
over 8% and France above 9%. Finally, quantitatively, would a reform of the housing market lead
to a dramatic improvement in labor market performance in the US or in Europe?
3 Model
3.1 Preferences and Search in the Housing Sector
Time is continuous and individuals discount the future at rate r. Individuals live in dwellings,
defined as a bundle of services generating utility to individuals or a household. The defining
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Table 3: Gasoline Prices
US$/gal.
United States 1.80
France 5.60
Belgium 6.17
Germany 5.79
Italy 5.79
Hungary 7.51
Netherlands 6.47
Norway 6.09
Source: German Technical
Corporation, 2007
characteristic of a dwelling, however, is that the services it provides are attached to a fixed location.
The services can, of course, depend on the quality of the dwelling and its particular location.
Amenities such as space, comfort, proximity to theaters, recreation, shops and the proximity to
one’s job increase the utility of a given dwelling. The dwelling may also be a factor of production
of home-produced goods. In addition, the dwelling could be a capital asset. For these services,
individuals pay a rent or a mortgage.
In this paper we focus on one particular amenity, distance to work. Because a dwelling is fixed
to a location, the commuting distance to one’s job, ρ , becomes an important determinant of both
job and housing choice. We assume that space is symmetric, in the sense that the unemployed have
the same chance of finding a job wherever their current residence, implying that ρ is a sufficient
statistic determining both housing and job choice. We call this property the isotropy of space:
wherever an individual is, space looks the same.
Agents face two types of housing shocks. First, they may receive a family shock that arrives
according to a Poisson process with parameter δ . The shock changes the valuation of the current
location, necessitating a move. This shock can be thought of as a marriage, divorce, the arrival of
children, deterioration of the neighborhood, and so on. Upon the arrival of the shock they make
one draw from the existing stock of housing vacancies, distributed as GS(ρ).4 Note that agents
4The one draw assumption is not very strong. It is equivalent to making up to N independent draws, in which case
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may sample from the existing stock of houses at any time.
Second, agents randomly receive new housing opportunities that (possibly) allows them to
relocate closer to their job. These arrivals are assumed to be Poisson with parameter λH . The
distribution of new vacancies is given as GN(ρ).
We make the simplifying assumption that the efficiency of the housing market can be captured
in a single variable, λH , the parameter determining frictions in the housing market. An increase
in λH means there are more arrivals of opportunities to find housing. As λH approaches infinity,
housing frictions go to zero. The main idea behind λH is that agents may not move instantaneously
to their preferred location. Such restrictions might arise from length of lease requirements or evic-
tion policies. In the Appendix we discuss the relationship between housing market regulations and
housing offers, λH , but for now we assume it represents housing market frictions. This implies that
the rent or mortgage is such that utility across dwellings will be equalized to reflect any differences
in amenities, a fact that results from the assumption that space (distance) is isotropic.
3.2 Labor Market
Individuals can be in one of two states: employed or unemployed. While employed, income
consists of an exogenous wage, w.5 There is no on-the-job search, yet a match may become
unprofitable, leading to a separation, which occurs exogenously with Poisson arrival rate s.
Unemployed agents receive income b, where b can be thought of as unemployment insurance
or the utility from not working. While unemployed, job offers arrive at Poisson rate p, indexed by
a distance to work, ρ , drawn from the cumulative distribution function FJ .
Let E(ρ) be the value of employment for an individual residing at distance ρ from the job.
Let U be the value of unemployment, which does not depend on distance, given the symmetry
assumption made above. We can now express the problem in terms of the following Bellman
it is like one single draw from a distribution (GS)N . See Lemma 1 in Quentin et al. (2006).
5An exogenous wage greatly simplifies the analysis because the wage does not depend on commute distance.
However, in the calibration we allow the wage to depend on taxes and benefits and examine alternative choices for
the parameters as a robustness check on the importance of this assumption. In the Appendix we show how the model
could be recast in terms of a wage-posting framework.
8
equations:
(r+ s)E(ρ) = w− τρ+ sU +λH
∫
max
[
0,(E(ρ ′)−E(ρ))]dGN(ρ ′) (1)
+δ
∫
max[U−E(ρ),E(ρ ′′)−E(ρ)]dGS(ρ ′′)
(r+ p)U = b+ p
∫ ∫
max[U,E(ρ ′),E(ρ
′′
)]dFJ(ρ ′)dGS(ρ ′′), (2)
where τ is the per unit cost of commuting and ρ is the distance of the commute.6 Eq. 1 states that
workers receive a utility flow w− τρ; may lose their job and become unemployed – in which case
they stay where they are; they receive a housing offer from the distribution of new vacancies GN ,
which happens with intensity λH , in which case they have the option of moving closer to their job;
and finally may receive a family shock δ , and need to relocate.
Eq. 2 states that the unemployed enjoy b; receive a job offer with Poisson intensity p, at a
distance ρ ′, from the distribution FJ(ρ). They have the option of rejecting the offer if the distance
is too far, but also have the option to move instantaneously if they find a residence in the stock
of existing vacant units. To the extent that ρ ′ and ρ ′′ are independent draws, this means that
there is a distribution, F , combining FJ and GS such that the integral terms can be rewritten as∫
max[U,E(ρ)]dF(ρ), where ρ is the minimum of the two draws: ρ = Min(ρ ′,ρ ′′).7
4 Optimal Behavior, Equilibrium and Steady-states
4.1 Reservation Strategies
We now derive the job acceptance and moving strategies of individuals. Observe that E is down-
ward sloping in ρ , with slope
∂E
∂ρ
=
−τ
r+ s+λHPW +δ
, (3)
6It is possible to reinterpret commuting as any non-pecuniary aspect of the job.
7We prove in the appendix that 1−F(ρ) = (1−FJ(ρ))(1−GS(ρ)).
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where PW is the probability of moving conditional on receiving a housing offer. Note that 0<PW <
1 and possibly depends on ρ . The function E(ρ) is monotonic so that there exists a well-defined
reservation strategy for the employed, with a reservation distance denoted by ρE(ρ), below which
a housing offer is accepted. Note that there is state-dependence in the reservation strategy of the
employed, ρE(ρ), with presumably dρE(ρ)/dρ > 0. Evidently, the further away the tenants live
from their job, the less likely they will be to reject a housing offer.
After some intermediate steps (described in Appendix), we can show that the slope of E(ρ) is
given by
∂E
∂ρ
=
−τ
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δ
. (4)
Next, in the absence of relocation costs (this case is studied in the Appendix), tenants move as
soon as they get a dwelling offer closer to their current one, implying
ρE(ρ) = ρ.
Denote by ρU the reservation distance for the unemployed, below which any job offer is accepted,
it is defined by
E(ρU) =U.
Using the fact that E(ρU) =U ,
b+ p
∫ ρu
0
[E(ρ ′)−U ]dF(ρ ′)
= w− τρU +λH
∫ ρU
0
[E(ρ ′)−U ]dGN(ρ ′)+δ
∫ ρu
0
[E(ρ ′′)−U ]dGS(ρ ′′). (5)
Integrating Eq. 5 by parts gives:
ρU =
w−b
τ
+
∫ ρU
0
λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)− pF(ρ)
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δ
dρ. (6)
The determination of ρU is shown in Figure 2.
Note that a job separation can occur in two ways. First, as mentioned above, there is an exoge-
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nous shock, s, inducing a separation from the match. Second, workers may receive a family shock,
δ , requiring them to redraw from the vacant housing stock distribution, GS, but are unable to find
a sufficiently close dwelling to the current job and (optimally) quit. That is, job separations are
given by
σ = s+δ (1−GS(ρu)). (7)
With this specification the model is quite parsimonious, since a single variable, ρ , determines
several dimensions of choice:
1. Job acceptance: F(ρU) ;
2. Residential mobility rate:
∫
λHGN(ρ) over the distribution of commute distance of employed
workers dΦ;
3. Quit rate due to a family shock: δ (1−GS(ρU)).
4.2 Free Entry
Assuming free entry of firms, and defining θ = VU as labor market tightness, we have
y−w
r+σ
=
c
q(θ)PF
,
where PF is the rate of acceptance of job offers by the unemployed, as expected from the viewpoint
of the firm. We assume, still by symmetry, that the distribution of contacts between the firm and
unemployed workers is given as F(ρ), so that PF = F(ρU). This generates a positive link between
θ and ρU since q′(θ)< 0, characterized by:
q(θ)F(ρU) =
c(r+σ)
y−w . (8)
The intuition is quite simple. The firm’s iso-profit curve at the entry stage depends negatively
on both θ (as a higher θ implies more competition between the firm and the worker) and on ρU (as
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Figure 2: Determination of ρu
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more of their offers will be rejected because of distance). The zero-profit condition thus implies
a positive link between θ and ρU . Note that this relation is independent of λH . On the other
hand, ρU is determined through (Eq. 6). It is decreasing in p(θ) and thus in θ , as can be seen
in (Eq. 21). When there are more job offers (higher θ ) workers can wait for offers closer to their
current residential location; they are pickier. The two curves are represented in (ρU ,θ ) space in
Figure 3.
4.3 Unemployment and the Beveridge Curve
Recapitulating, an increase in λH , the efficiency of the housing sector, raises the acceptance rate of
job offers, increasing θ and thus increasing job offers by firms.
Letting p(θ) = θq(θ), the steady state unemployment rate is given as
u =
σ
σ + p(θ)F(ρU)
. (9)
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Figure 3: Vacancies and Reservation Strategy
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In terms of a Beveridge Curve representation (vacancy and unemployment space), increasing λH
shifts the Beveridge curve inward (less structural mismatch) and also leads to a counter-clockwise
rotation of θ . A graphical representation of this result is shown in Figure 4.
5 Housing Frictions and Mobility
5.1 The Effect of Regulations in the Housing Market
It is now possible to determine how housing frictions affect the decisions of workers and firms.
Proposition 1 An increase in λH makes the unemployed less choosy about jobs: ∂ρU/∂λH > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Next, differentiating (Eq. 8) and using Proposition 1, we can determine the effect of housing
frictions on job creation:
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Figure 4: Beveridge Curve
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Proposition 2 An increase in λH increases job creation: ∂θ/∂λH > 0.
Proof. Same as Proposition 1.
This is an indirect effect caused by more job creation through the higher job acceptance rate of
workers. Another interpretation of this effect is that firms don’t like to create jobs where workers
have no place to live.
Using these results it is now possible to determine the effect of housing market frictions on
unemployment.
Proposition 3 An increase in λH has three effects on unemployment:
• it reduces the quit rate in case of a δ -shock;
• it raises the job acceptance rate of workers (through a higher thresehold ρU );
• it raises θ (Proposition 2) and thus job creation.
Proof. See Appendix.
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5.2 Distribution of commute distance
Let Φ(ρ) be the steady-state distribution of employed workers living at a location closer than ρ . Φ
is governed by the following law of motion, for all ρ < ρU :
(1−u)∂Φ(ρ)
∂ t
=upF(ρ)+(1−u)(1−Φ(ρ)){λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)}
−δ (1−u)Φ(ρ)(1−GS(ρ))− (1−u)Φ(ρ)s
(10)
Eq. 10 states that the number of people residing in a location at a distance less than ρ from
their job changes (either positively or negatively) due to:
• (+) the unemployed, u, receiving a job offer at rate p with a distance closer to ρ with proba-
bility F(ρ);
• (+) the employed, 1− u, who are further away from the current distance ρ (a fraction
1−Φ(ρ)), who receive an offer in the housing market with intensity λH closer to ρ with
probability GN(ρ);
• (+) the employed, 1− u, who are further away from the current distance ρ (a fraction 1−
Φ(ρ)), who face a δ -shock that brings them closer to ρ after sampling in the stock GS;
• (-) the employed, 1− u, who were at a distance less than ρ (a fraction Φ(ρ)), receive a
δ -shock that brings them further away from ρ after sampling in the stock GS; note that a
fraction of them would even quit if their new ρ is above ρU ;
• (-) the employed, 1−u, who receive an s-shock, that is, exogenous job destruction.
In steady state and for all ρ < ρuM :
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Φ(ρ) =
λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)+ pF(ρ) u1−u
λHGN(ρ)+δ + s
(11)
=
λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)+
F(ρ)
F(ρu)σ
λHGN(ρ)+δ + s
(12)
=
λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)+
F(ρ)
F(ρu)σ
λHGN(ρ)+δ +σ
≤ 1 (13)
The second line above is obtained by replacing u with its steady-state expression in (Eq. 9). Note
that for ρ = ρU , Φ(ρU) = 1 as no unemployed individual ever accepts a job offer farther away
from a job than ρU .
5.3 Log Linearization
First, consider the special case: λH →∞. In the case where housing frictions go to zero, the model
collapses to Φ(ρ) = 1, meaning that all workers will be located epsilon-close to their job. The job
acceptance decision is indeterminate since we now have
ρU =
w−b
τ
+
∫ ρU
0
dρ.
The intuition is straightforward: if w > b, all job offers are accepted, meaning that ρU goes to
infinity. Therefore, we obtain the standard Pissarides value for tightness: q(θP) = c(r+σ)y−w with
θP > θ ∗ where θ ∗ is equilibrium tightness in our mode. In addition,
q(θP)
q(θ ∗)
= F(ρU)< 1
and therefore, with q(θ +dθ) = q(θ)+q′(θ)dθ = q(θ)(1+ηqdθ/θ), we have
q(θP)
q(θ ∗)
= 1+ηqdθ/θ ∗ = F(ρU)
hence
dθ
θ ∗
= θP−θ ∗ = 1−F(ρ
U)
−ηq > 0
16
The percentage change in tightness is of the order of magnitude of the rejection rate of job offers
divided by the elasticity of matching. Since the percentage change in unemployment is the per-
centage change in tightness multiplied by (1− u)ηp, the overall change in unemployment due to
imperfect housing markets is of the order of magnitude of the fraction of rejected offers 1−F(ρU)
if ηp '−ηq ' 0.5.
6 Calibration
6.1 Calibration targets
In this section we will match the model to the data, in particular the mobility rates. We therefore
need to calculate the mobility rate from the model. Denote by MSK the number of movers of status
S = (U,E) (unemployed, employed) and for reason K = (J,D) (job-related or family-related), we
have:
1. Job-related mobility of the employed (those with a job but relocate once they sample a better
housing location):
MEJ = (1−u)λH
∫ ρU
0
GN(ρ)dΦ(ρ) (14)
= (1−u)λH
[
GN(ρU)−
∫ ρU
0
gN(ρ)Φ(ρ)dρ
]
, (15)
where the second line is found by integrating by parts and noticing that Φ(ρU) = 1.
2. Job-related mobility of the unemployed (those who have a job offer, accept it with probability
G(ρU) and may relocate if they drew a location from GS closer from their current ρ):
MUJ = up
∫ ρU
0
GS(ρ)dFJ(ρ)
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3. Family-related mobility:
MUD = uδ
MED = (1−u)δ
ME+UD = δ
Note that in MED , some workers quit their job (a fraction 1−GS(ρU)) since they did not find
acceptable housing in the current stock.
6.2 Taxes, Benefits and Wages
So far, the model has abstracted from taxes. As shown in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and
Prescott (2004), taxes and benefits can explain much, if not all, of the variation in unemployment
rates across countries. We therefore introduce a tax on labor denoted by t which will be set to
0.22 for the US and 0.4 for Europe. However, it is quite well known that taxes on labor lower
wages and therefore that there is a “crowding out” effect: A one percentage point increase in taxes
does not necessarily imply a one percentage point increase in labor costs. The net effect depends,
in principle, on the elasticity of demand, supply and the bargaining power of workers. In the
model developed so far, it is possible to make wages endogenous and introduce a bargaining game.
However, the cost is to lose most of the simplicity of the model as the wage will then depend on
commute distance. We take an alternative route here: Keep an exogenous wage, but argue that part
of the effect of taxes is diluted due to a crowding out parameter denoted by ε .8 In short, if taxes
are t, the total labor cost is denoted by w(1+ εt) and the net wage of workers is w[1− (1− ε)t]. It
follows that the main equations of the model become:
q(θ)F(ρU) =
c(r+σ)
y−w(1+ εt) (16)
ρU =
w[1− (1− ε)t]−b
τ
+
∫ ρU
0
λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)− pF(ρ)
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δ
dρ, (17)
8In the Appendix we derive results for endogenous wages in a wage posting model
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while the stock-flow equations and the rate of unemployment are unchanged. We set ε to be 0.35,
implying that a 10% increase in labor taxes generates a 3.5% increase in labor costs and a 6.5%
decrease in the net wage of workers.9
Finally, it is unrealistic to assume that a change in unemployment benefits has no direct effect
on wages, and only an indirect effect on the average wage in the economy through an increase
in reservation wages. This is why in the calibration we allow for the direct effect by arguing that
w(b) =wUS+(1−β )(b−bUS) where any additional dollar of unemployment compensation raises
the wage by 1-β where β can be thought of as the bargaining power of workers: This is the same
specification as that emerging from Nash-bargaining. We set β = 0.5 so that the bargaining power
is symmetric. We set wUS = 0.6 and the output generated in the match is normalized to y = 1.
Labor taxes in the US are given by t = 0.22 and unemployment benefits are b = 0.25. Labor taxes
in Europe are t = 0.4 and unemployment benefits are equal to b = 0.4 (for a wage of 0.627). So,
roughly speaking a replacement rate of 42% in the US and 64% in Europe.
One could, of course, fully endogenize wages (e.g. Nash-bargaining) but then would face the
same problem as discussed above (the wage would depend on distance) and hence we choose to
preserve the simplicity of the model and a realistic, but ad hoc, wage in the calibration.
6.3 Calibration
The time period is one month and the interest rate, r, is set to 0.0033, corresponding to an annual
rate of 0.04. We calibrate to the mobility rate of the employed, 15.5% annually between March
1999 and March 2000, so the target is (15.5/12)%. The number for the employed that move comes
from the Bureau of the Census.10 Of the roughly 31 million persons who moved during that year,
22.3 million of them were employed, 1.5 million unemployed and 7.8 million out of the labor
force.
9Assuming that ε is being approximated by εLS/(εLS + εLD) where εLS and εLD are the absolute elasticities of
labor supply and labor demand, this would imply that εLD/εLS = 2.
10Why People Move: Exploring the March 2000 Current Population Survey, P23-204, Bureau of the Census, May,
2001.
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We have three distributions to account for: GN , new housing offers, GS, the stock of houses
and F , job offers. We assume that these distributions are represented by exponential functions with
parameter α: F = GN = 1− e−αρ and GS = 1− e−(α/3)ρ .
To calculate α and τ , we proceed as follows. First, Table 4 shows the distribution of commute
times times from the Census 2000 as a fraction of total hours worked. The median commuter
spends 0.083 of its working time to commute.
Table 4: Commute time as a fraction of total hours worked
US Fr
Mean 0.102 0.079
10th percentile 0.020 0.021
25th percentile 0.041 0.031
Median 0.083 0.063
75th percentile 0.125 0.094
90th percentile 0.188 0.167
We assume that each hour of commute time has a utility cost estimated to be half of the hourly
wage of workers (see Van Ommeren, Van den Berg, and Gorter (2000)). Hence, the total me-
dian cost for the median commuter should be 0.083/2 expressed as a fraction of the wage, or
0.083/2*(w/y) as a fraction of output (normalized to 1).
The total median cost is also calculated from the distribution of wage offers. Letting ρm be the
median commute distance, ln2/α , the total cost incurred for the median commuter is therefore
given by
0.083/2∗ (w/y) = τρm = ln2/α
or
τα =
ln2
0.083/2∗ (w/y) .
We then estimate α from the slope of the distribution F in the data. Inspection of Figure 5 shows
that there is an optimal value of α that best approximates the c.d.f. We find empirically that it is
equal to 9.77 after estimating ln(1-F(αρ))=αρ from the data. Hence, τ = 0.52.
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Unsurprisingly, given that commute costs per kilometer are higher in France and the benefits
are higher, the mean commute time as well as the median are two percentage points lower in
France: the unemployed are more choosy.
Figure 5: Distribution of Commute Times in the U.S.
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The program finds the parameters of the model given a target unemployment rate of 4.2% in the
U.S. (the average between March 1999 and March 2000), and a target job hiring rate of p = 1/2.4
monthly. The latter implies an average duration of unemployment of 2.4 months and therefore
imposes a value for σ given that u = σ/(σ + p) then σ = p(u/(1−u)) = 0.0183.
We match the mobility rate to a target value of 17.2% annually with (Eq. 15). The program
finds the values of α and λH that are consistent with the target for mobility, given ρU , obtained
from (Eq. 6).
We set p(θ) = Aθ 0.5 ∗F(ρU). Setting θ = 1 gives A = 0.586. Together with the free-entry
condition, (Eq. 8), this fixes a value for recruiting costs c after normalizing y = 1.
To find the cost of commuting in Europe relative to the US, we use information from the tax
authorities in the U.S. and France as well as gas prices given in Table 3. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) in the U.S. and the tax authority BO Impoˆts in France provide standard mileage
rates when using a car for business. For 2007, the allowance was $0.485 per mile (0.20 euro per
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mile) in the U.S. and 0.514 euro per kilometer for a 6CV car.11 In addition, the price of gas in most
European countries is at least double that in the U.S. However, since the typical US car consumes
more gas per kilometer than in Europe, we assume that τEU = 1.5*τUS.
6.4 Findings
The findings for the benchmark economy are given in Table 5. The second column of the table
increases benefits from 0.25 to 0.4. The third column then increases taxes to 0.4, keeping benefits
at 0.4. The fourth column increases the commute cost by 1.5, holding fixed the taxes and benefits
in the earlier columns. The fifth column divides the arrival rate of housing offers by 2.1 (to match
the mobility rate in Europe), keeping fixed the parameters in the other columns. The fact that the
arrival of housing offers needs to be divided by 2.1 suggests that the housing market in Europe is
considerably more sclerotic than that of the U.S.
The combination of benefits and taxes more than doubles the unemployment rate, similar to that
in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). The inclusion of the housing market frictions and commute
increases the unemployment rate by about 50%, from 9.6% to 13.3%.
It is also possible to calculate elasticities and slopes implied by the model. In particular, we
can examine how changes in benefits, taxes, housing frictions and commuting costs affect unem-
ployment and mobility. The elasticities and slopes are given in Table 6.
Table 5: U.S. Calibration
Benchmark Higher b Higher b, tax τ ∗1.5 λh/2.1
θh 1.000 0.685 0.268 0.194 0.186
ρU 0.055 0.051 0.043 0.036 0.036
Unemp 0.042 0.054 0.096 0.129 0.133
Un. Dur. 2.400 3.125 5.802 8.015 8.336
Reject 0.836 0.848 0.869 0.889 0.891
Mobility (x 100) 0.244 0.227 0.197 0.169 0.082
11The rate is progressive with power in France, ranging from 0.37 to 0.67 euro per kilometer.
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Table 6: Elasticities and Slopes
Unemployment Mobility
Elasticity Slope (%) Elasticity Slope (%)
Benefits 0.505 0.839 −0.066 −0.076
Taxes 0.270 0.511 −0.069 −0.090
Commuting cost (τ) 0.698 0.558 −0.330 −0.184
Housing (λ ) −0.093 −0.903 0.964 6.543
Our findings indicate that labor market institutions account for a large part of cross-country
differences in unemployment but perform poorly in terms of explaining low mobility. Adding in
housing frictions and commute costs delivers both low mobility and a quite sizeable increase in
unemployment. Taxes and benefits alone generate a 4 percentage point increase in unemployment
when European values are chosen instead of US values, a realistic increase in commute costs of
50% and a 30% increase in frictions in the housing markets raise unemployment by an additional
4 to 5 percentage points. Interestingly, housing frictions, per se, account for only a small portion
of unemployment when commute costs are low. In other words, there is strong complementarity
between the two parameters.
6.5 Robustness
Due to the fact that the wage is not endogenous we now provide several robustness exercises to
show how the findings change with a change in the parameters. Table 7 shows how unemployment
is affected by changes in β , ε and α . Changing β or α has only small effects on unemployment.
However, changes in ε has large effects on unemploymeng. When ε = .15 unemployment rises to
over 20%. Note that this value of ε means that the wage of the worker falls by 85%.
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Table 7: Robustness: Effects on Unemployment
Benchmark Higher b Higher b, tax τ ∗1.5 λh/2.1
Changes in β
β = 0.5 0.042 0.054 0.0956 0.1272 0.1322
β = 0.4 0.042 0.054 0.0911 0.1212 0.1263
β = 0.3 0.042 0.054 0.0877 0.1166 0.1219
β = 0.6 0.042 0.054 0.1013 0.1349 0.1399
β = 0.7 0.042 0.054 0.1088 0.1449 0.1499
Changes in ε
ε = 0.15 0.042 0.0597 0.1475 0.197 0.2026
ε = 0.25 0.042 0.0564 0.1124 0.1498 0.1551
ε = 0.35 0.042 0.054 0.0956 0.1272 0.1322
ε = 0.45 0.042 0.0522 0.0861 0.1143 0.1193
ε = 0.55 0.042 0.051 0.0805 0.1068 0.1118
Changes in α
α = 9.77 0.042 0.054 0.0956 0.1272 0.1322
α = 11 0.042 0.0539 0.0953 0.1267 0.1317
α = 13 0.042 0.0538 0.095 0.1259 0.1309
α = 9 0.042 0.054 0.0957 0.1275 0.1325
α = 7 0.042 0.0541 0.0961 0.1282 0.1334
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7 Concluding Comments
In this paper we have taken seriously the idea that labor market frictions, and in particular the
reservation strategies of unemployed workers when they decide whether to accept a job offer,
depend strongly on the functioning of the housing market. This interconnection between two
frictional markets (housing and labor) can be used to understand differences in the functioning
of labor markets. This paper has offered such a model, based on decisions to accept or reject a
job offer, given the commuting distance to jobs. The model is relatively parsimonious, thanks
to simplifying assumptions such as the isotropy of space, an unrealistic assumption but which
conveniently provides closed form solutions and makes it possible to explain quit, job acceptance
and geographic mobility decisions with a decision rule based on a single dimension.
We have attempted to explain differences in mobility rates between Europe and the US. A
calibration exercise of “Europe” and the US is able to account for differences in unemployment and
mobility thanks to a parameter which captures the speed of arrival of housing offers to households.
In our calibration, we find that labor market institutions account for a large part of cross-country
differences in unemployment but perform poorly in terms of explaining low mobility. In contrast,
our “spatial block”, that is housing frictions combined to higher commute costs, explain well low
mobility and a quite sizeable increase in unemployment : while taxes and benefits generate a
4 percentage point increase in unemployment when European values are chosen instead of US
values, a realistic increase in commute costs of 50% and a 30% increase in frictions in the housing
markets raise unemployment by an additional 4 to 5 percentage points.
Interestingly enough, housing frictions, per se, account for only a small portion of unemploy-
ment when commute costs are low: there is a strong complementarity between the two parameters:
when commuting is costly and when it is difficult to relocate in the future, then job rejection is
much more frequent.
Future work should attempt to enrich the model to introduce more specific urban features such
as anisotropy of space and the existence of centers in cities and suburbs, as well as different groups
of the labor force. Our work is a first step in integrating housing and labor markets in a coherent
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macroeconomic model. In particular, since the model is simple, it can be extended to deal with
new issues such as discrimination in the housing market, mobility allowances or “moving toward
opportunity” schemes, spatial misatch issues and so on, as in the urban economics literature.
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Table 8: Mobility, Regulations and Unemployment
Mobility rate Housing Average
outside the area market regulation unemployment
within 3 yrs. index rate 1995-2001
Denmark 0.054 3.6 5.3
Netherlands 0.029 3 4.2
Belgium 0.013 3.17 8.5
France 0.042 3.6 10.4
Ireland 0.010 3.2 7.9
Italy 0.011 4.24 10.7
Greece 0.011 4.31 10.5
Spain 0.009 4.81 14.5
Portugal 0.007 4.54 5.6
Austria 0.015 3.62 4.02
Finland 0.058 2.53 11.9
Germany 0.021 3.76 8.3
UK 0.072 2.22 6.5
Source: Mobility data from ECHP. Regulation indices from Djankov et
al. (2002). Unempoyment rates from Eurostat.
8 Appendix
8.1 Evidence on Mobility, Regulations and Why People Move
This section provides evidence on the relationship between housing market regulations and mo-
bility across the EU. Table 8 shows an index of housing market regulations derived by xxxx and
unemployment rates for several countries.
Table 9 gives some additional information on reasons for moving.12
Finally, Table 10 shows that the reasons for work-related mobility are quite different within
and across counties. As expected, intra-county work-related moves bring workers closer to their
job, while 70% of inter-county work-related moves are related to a new job.
12Why People Move: Exploring the March 2000 Current Population Survey, Current Population Reports, P23-204,
May, 2001, U.S. Department of the Census.
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Table 9: Reasons for Moving, U.S.
Work House
new job or job transfer 60.5% wanted own home, not rent 22.2%
look for work or lost job 9.7% wanted new or better home/apartment 35.8%
closer to work / easier commute 19.6% wanted better neighborhood/less crime 8.6%
retire 2.4% wanted cheaper housing 10.8%
other job related reason 7.7% other housing reason 22.6%
All work related reasons 100% All house related reasons 100%
Family Other
change in marital status 23% attend or leave college 38.2%
establish own household 27.2% change of climate 11.0%
other family reason 49.8% health reason 17.2%
All family related reasons 100% other reasons 33.6%
All other related reasons 100%
Table 10: Work-related Moves, U.S.
Work related All Intra Inter
new job or job transfer 60.5% 24.5% 69.4%
look for work or lost job 9.7% 9.4% 7.7%
closer to work / easier commute 19.6% 53.5% 13.6%
retire 2.4% 1.4% 3.0%
other job related reason 7.7% 11.1% 6.3%
total 100% 100% 100%
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8.2 Link between F , FJ and GS
We start from the integrand A =
∫ ∫
max[U,E(ρ ′),E(ρ ′′)]dFJ(ρ ′)dGS(ρ ′′). We can rewrite A as
A =
∫ ∫
{I[ρ ′ > ρU ]I[ρ ′′ > ρU ]U
+I[ρ ′ < ρ ′′]I[ρ ′ < ρU ]E(ρ ′)
+I[ρ ′′ < ρ ′]I[ρ ′′ < ρU ]E(ρ ′′)}
dFJ(ρ ′)dGS(ρ ′′).
This can be written as:
A = U
∫
ρU
dFJ(ρ ′)
∫
ρU
dGS(ρ ′′)
+
∫ ρU
0
E(ρ ′)
(∫
ρ ′
dGS(ρ ′′)
)
dFJ(ρ ′)
+
∫ ρU
0
E(ρ ′′)
(∫
ρ ′′
dFJ(ρ ′)
)
dGS(ρ ′′),
or
A = U(1−FJ(ρU))(1−GS(ρU))
+
∫ ρU
0
E(ρ ′)
(
1−GS(ρ ′)
)
dFJ(ρ ′)
+
∫ ρU
0
E(ρ ′′)
(
1−FJ(ρ ′′)
)
dGS(ρ ′′).
Letting F = 1− (1−FJ(ρ))(1−GS(ρ)), gives
dF = (1−FJ)dGS+(1−GS)dFJ,
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and we can thus rewrite as
A = U(1−FJ(ρU))(1−GS(ρU))
+
∫ ρU
0
E(ρ)dF(ρ)
=
∫
max(U,E(ρ))dF(ρ)
The last equality comes from the observation that 1−F(ρU) = (1−FJ(ρU))(1−GS(ρU)).
8.3 Proofs
Proof the slope of E(ρ)
We need to rewrite Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 as:
(r+ s)E(ρ) = w− τρ+ sU +λH
∫ ρU
0
[E(ρ ′)−E(ρ)]dGN(ρ ′) (18)
+δ
∫ ρu
0
[E(ρ ′)−E(ρ)]dGS(ρ ′′)+δ
∫ +∞
ρu
[U−E(ρ)]dGS(ρ ′′)
(r+ p)U = b+ p
∫ ρu
0
[E(ρ ′)]dF(ρ ′)+ pU(1−F(ρu)). (19)
Proof of the determination of ρU
Rewrite the Bellman equations as:
rE(ρ) = w− τρ+ s(U−E(ρ))+λH
∫ ρE(ρ)
0
(E ′−E)dGN(ρ ′)
+
∫ ρU
0
[E ′′(ρ)−E(ρ)]dGS(ρ)+
∫ +∞
ρU
[U−E(ρ)]dGS(ρ)
rU = b+ p
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dF(ρ ′)
Here, since ρE(ρ) = ρ , we apply this formula in ρ = ρU of E in ρU , we have:
rE(ρU) = w− τρU + s(U−E(ρU))+λH
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−E(ρU))dGN(ρ ′)+
∫ ρU
0
[E ′′(ρ)−E(ρ)]dGS(ρ)
= rU = b+ p
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dF(ρ ′)
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so
ρU =
λH
τ
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dGN(ρ ′)+ δτ
∫ ρU
0
[E ′′(ρ)−E(ρ)]dGS(ρ)− pτ
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dF(ρ ′)+w−b
τ
(20)
This equation simplifies a bit. Noting that
∂E
∂ρ
=
−τ
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δ
integration by parts leads to
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dH(ρ ′) =
∫ ρU
0
τH(ρ)
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)
dρ
for all H distributions such that H(0) = 0, we can thus rewrite ρU as in the text (equation Eq. 6).
Proof of Proposition 1
Fully differentiating ρu gives
dρU
(
r+ s+ pF(ρ)
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δ
)
=
(∫ ρU
0
GN(ρ)(r+ s)+ pF(ρ)GN(ρ)
[r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δ ]2
dρ
)
dλH (21)
−
(∫ ρU
0
F(ρ)dρ
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δ
)
d p+d
(
w−b
τ
.
)
Equation (Eq. 21) indicates that ρU depends positively on λH , negatively on p and positively on
w−b. An increase in λH (more housing offers) will shift the curve in Figure 2 upward, raising ρU
and thus the acceptance rate of the unemployed. The intuition is simply that they take the job offer
knowing that they will be able to find a better location in the near future because housing offers
arrive very frequently.
Proof of Proposition 3
Differentiating u, and letting ωθ represent the partial derivative of θ to λH . gives:
du
dλH
=
−δgS(ρU)ωρ(σ + p(θ)F(ρU))−σ [−δgS(ρU)ωρ + p(θ) f (ρU)ωρ + p′(θ)F(ρU)ωθ ]
[σ + p(θ)F(ρU)]2
=
−δgS(ρU)p(θ)F(ρU)ωρ −σ
[
p(θ) f (ρU)ωρ + p′(θ)F(ρU)ωθ
]
[σ + p(θ)F(ρU)]2
.
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Next, note that
dσ
dλH
=−δgS(ρU)∂ρ
U
∂λH
=−δgS(ρU)ωρ < 0,
where ωρ is simply a convenient notation for the partial derivative of ρu to λH and
d[p(θ)F(ρU)]
dλH
= p′(θ)F(ρU)
∂θ
∂λh
+ p(θ) f (ρU)
∂ρU
∂λH
= p(θ) f (ρU)ωρ + p′(θ)F(ρU)ωθ > 0.
8.4 Adding up moving costs
Let C be a relocation cost paid by workers. We ignore here GS assumed to be degenerate and fix
δ = 0. We have thus:
rE(ρ) = w− τρ+ s(U−E(ρ))+λH
∫
max
[
0,(E ′−E−C)]dGN(ρ ′)
rU = b+ p
∫
(E ′−U)dF(ρ ′)
E is downward sloping in ρ with slope
dE
dρ
=
−τ
r+ s+λHPW
where PW ≥ 0 is the probability to move conditional on receving a housing offer, with 0 < PW < 1
possibly depends on ρ . The function E(ρ) is thus monotonic and there is thus a well-defined
reservation strategy, with a reservation distance denoted by ρE for the employed above which a
housing offer is rejected. Note in addition that there is NOW state-dependence in the reservation
strategy of the employed: we have that ρE(ρ) with presumably dρE/dρ > 0: the further away the
tenants live from her job, the less likely they will reject an offer. (NB: to be shown in the general
case). We can rewrite
PW = GN(ρE(ρ))
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and obtain the Bellman equations as:
rE(ρ) = w− τρ+ s(U−E(ρ))+λH
∫ ρE(ρ)
0
(E ′−E−C)dGN(ρ ′)
rU = b+ p
∫ ρU
0
(E ′−U)dF(ρ ′)
8.5 Housing Market Regulations and Housing Offers
We now provide a simple explanation for the link between housing market regulations mentioned
in the Introduction and the parameter λH , the arrival of housing offers, that is, we describe an
extension that endogenizes λH .
Landlords post vacancies and screen applicants. They offer a lease to the “best applicants”, in
a sense defined below. In case of a default on the rent by the tenant, however, landlords incur a loss
due to the length of litigation and eviction procedures. The asset value of owning a dwelling with
a tenant defaulting on the rent is denoted by Λ. Therefore, Λ will decline with more regulations in
the rental housing market, due to the length of the procedures to recover the unpaid rent and the
dwelling.
Potential tenants (applicants) are all ex-ante homogenous but ex-post may represent a default
risk for the landlord. More precisely, at the time of the contact between the applicant, the landlord
gets a random signal on the tenant and postulates that the particular applicant has a specific default
rate δi (a Poisson rate in continuous time). It follows that for such a tenant, the value of a filled
vacancy for the landlord is:
rHF = R+δi(Λ−HF),
where R is the rent and HF is the value of a filled vacancy.13 Therefore,
HF =
R+δiΛ
r+δi
. (22)
13Recall that we assumed in the model that the flow of services of the dwelling to the tenant was exactly compensat-
ing the rent so we did not need to include the rent in the Bellman equations of workers. We also assume that workers
do not benefit from defaulting on the rent: in case of default, they may have a disutulity exerted by landlords or their
lawyers so that, after default, the value of being in a dwelling is not higher than it was when paying. Therefore, the
expression for the Bellman equation of tenants derived previously is unchanged.
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The derivative of HF with respect to δi is given as Λr−R, which is negative since the landlord’s
value of a default, Λ, cannot be higher than the capitalized value of the rent R/δi. Therefore, HF is
decreasing in δi, from R/r to Λ. This implies that there will be a well defined reservation strategy
by landlords given the signal they receive.
To derive this reservation strategy, we denote by HV the value of a vacant housing unit prior
to screening. This value is exogenous and is given, in the long-run, by the cost of construction of
new housing units. Therefore, it is independent of rental regulations and, in particular, of Λ. At
the time of contact with a tenant, landlords decide to offer a lease if the perceived value of default
δi is below a cut-off value δ with
R+δΛ
r+δ
= HV
or δ =
R− rΛ
HV −Λ
Note that δ is increasing in Λ: the higher is Λ, the easier it is to accept a tenant since the risk of
default is lower.
Hence, the screening rate, α , of tenants is prob (δi > δ ). Denoting by L(δi) the c.d.f. of default
rates, we have
α = 1−L
(
R− rΛ
HV −Λ
)
The screening rate is therefore increasing when Λ is lower, that is, when rental housing market
regulations are higher.
Finally, denote by φ the Poisson rate at which tenants receive dwelling offers. We assume that
this contact rate is exogenous. It then follows that λH = φα . Therefore,
Proposition 4: λH is decreasing in the amount of housing market regulations.
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8.6 Endogenous Wage: A Wage Posting Model
The main equations of the model are unchanged, that is, Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 lead to the reservation
rule similar to Eq. 6, except that it now depends on the wage,
ρU(w) =
w(1− t)−b
τ
+
∫ ρU
0
λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)− pF(ρ)
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δ
dρ. (23)
The firm maximizes the ex-ante value of a vacancy,
w = ArgMax V (w) =
−γ+q(θ)F(ρU(w))J(w)
r
.
The first order condition is given as
q(θ) f (ρU)
dρU
dw
[y−w] = 1. (24)
Eq. 24 states that the marginal gain of raising the wage is equal to the marginal increase of
accepted job offers, f (ρU)dρ
U
dw , times the probablility per unit of time to meet a worker, q(θ),
times the value of a job, J(w), has to equal to the loss of profits of higher wages, −1/(r+σ).
Differentiating ρU from Eq. 23, we obtain
dρU(w)
dw
= (1− t)A(p), (25)
with
A(p) =
1
τ
1
1− λHGN(ρU )+δGS(ρU )−pF(ρU )r+s+λHGN(ρU )+δ −
∫ ρU
0
[λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)−pF(ρ)]δgS(ρU )
[r+s+λHGN(ρ)+δ ]2
dρ
,
which is downward sloping. Substituting Eq. 25 into Eq. 24, we obtain
q(θ) f (ρU)(1− t)A[y−w] = 1,
and therefore an expression for the optimal wage; in particular, the net wage and the gross wage:
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Gross wage : w = y− 1
q(θ) f (ρU)A(1− t)
Net wage : w(1− t) = y(1− t)− 1
q(θ) f (ρU)A
.
The inclusion of taxes raises the gross wage and reduces the net wage. Finally, replacing the
endogenous value of the wage into Eq. 23, we obtain a value for ρU which is downward sloping in
p and therefore θ .
ρU =
[
y(1− t)− 1q(θ) f (ρU )A
]
−b
τ
+
∫ ρU
0
λHGN(ρ)+δGS(ρ)− pF(ρ)
r+ s+λHGN(ρ)+δ
dρ. (26)
The free-entry of firms given their optimal wage is
V (w∗) = 0
leading to
y−w
r+σ
=
c
q(θ)F(ρU)
,
Now, replacing for the wage, we obtain
1
r+σ
1
A(p)(1− t) = c
f (ρU)
F(ρU)
(27)
We assume here that the distribution f has the declining likelihood ratio property, that is f (x)/F(x)
is decreasing in x. It follows that the right-hand side is decreasing in ρU and A(p) being decreasing
in p, the right-hand side is increasing in p and θ .
Overall, equation Eq. 27 defines a new relation between ρU and θ , which is negatively sloped.
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